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How does he arrive at this decision, unless it be through his knowledge as a financier, which, of course, he exercises without reference to the political implication of his decision, that modern wealth requires no defence, because it cannot be confiscated? If Mr. Harrison is right; if, as he implies, a nation's commerce, its very industrial existence, would disappear if it allowed neighbors who envied it that commerce to become its superiors in armaments, and to exercise political weight in the world, how does he explain the fact that the great Powers of the Continent are flanked by little nations far weaker than themselves having nearly always a commercial development equal to, and in most cases greater than [Pg 39] theirs?
If the common doctrines be true, the financiers would not invest a dollar in the territories of the undefended nations, and yet, far from that being the case, they consider that a Swiss or a Dutch investment is more secure than a German one; that industrial undertakings in a country like Switzerland defended by an army of a few thousand men, are preferable in point of security to enterprises backed by two millions of the most perfectly trained soldiers in the world.
The attitude of European finance in this matter is the absolute condemnation of the view commonly taken by the statesman. If a country's trade were really at the mercy of the first successful invader; if armies and navies were really necessary for the protection and promotion of trade, the small countries would be in a hopelessly inferior position, and could only exist on the sufferance of what we are told are unscrupulous aggressors.
And yet Norway has relatively to population a greater carrying trade than Great Britain, [8] and Dutch, Swiss, and Belgian merchants compete in all the markets of the world successfully with those of Germany and France. The prosperity of the small States is thus a fact which proves a good deal more than that wealth can be secure without armaments.
We have seen that the exponents of the orthodox statecraft—notably such authorities as Admiral Mahan—plead that armaments are a necessary part of the industrial [Pg 40] struggle, that they are used as a means of exacting economic advantage for a nation which would be impossible without them.
Well, the relative economic situation of the small States gives the lie to this profound philosophy. It is seen to be just learned nonsense when we realize that all the might of Russia or Germany cannot secure for the individual citizen better general economic conditions than those prevalent in the little States.
The citizens of Switzerland, Belgium, or Holland, countries without "control," or navy, or bases, or "weight in the councils of Europe," or the "prestige of a great Power," are just as well off as Germans, and a great deal better off than Austrians or Russians.
Thus, even if it could be argued that the security of the small States is due to the various treaties guaranteeing their neutrality, it cannot be argued that those treaties give them the political power and "control" and "weight in the councils of the nations" which Admiral Mahan and the other exponents of the orthodox statecraft assure us are such necessary factors in national prosperity. I want, with all possible emphasis, to indicate the limits of the argument that I am trying to enforce.
That argument is not that the facts just cited show armaments or the absence of them to be the sole or [Pg 41] even the determining factor in national wealth. It does show that the security of wealth is due to other things than armaments; that absence of political and military power is on the one hand no obstacle to, and on the other hand no guarantee of, prosperity; that the mere size of the administrative area has no relation to the wealth of those inhabiting it. Those who argue that the security of the small States is due to the international treaties protecting their neutrality are precisely those who argue that treaty rights are things that can never give security!
Thus one British military writer says:. The principle practically acted on by statesmen, though, of course, not openly admitted, is that frankly enunciated by Machiavelli: "A prudent ruler ought not to keep faith when by so doing it would be against his interests, and when the reasons which made him bind himself no longer exist.
The European waste-paper basket is the place to which all treaties eventually find their way, and a thing which can any day be placed in a waste-paper basket is a poor thing on which to hang our national safety.
Yet there are plenty of people in this country who quote treaties to us as if we could depend on their never being torn up.
Very plausible and very dangerous people they are—idealists too good and innocent for a hard, cruel world, where force is the chief law. Yet there are some such innocent people in Parliament even at present. It is to be hoped that we shall see none of them there in future. Major Murray is right to this extent: the militarist view, the view of those who "believe in war," and defend it even on moral grounds as a thing without which men would be "sordid," supports this philosophy of force, which flourishes in the atmosphere which the militarist regimen engenders.
But the militarist view involves a serious dilemma. If the security of a nation's wealth can only be assured by force, and treaty rights are mere waste paper, how can we explain the evident security of the wealth of States possessing relatively no force?
By the mutual jealousies of those guaranteeing their neutrality? Then that mutual jealousy could equally well guarantee the security of any one of the larger States against the rest.
Another Englishman, Mr. Farrer, has put the case thus:. If that recent agreement between England, Germany, France, Denmark, and Holland can so effectively relieve Denmark and Holland from the fear of invasion that Denmark can seriously consider the actual abolition of her army and navy, it seems only one further step to go, for all the Powers collectively, great and small, to guarantee the territorial independence of each one of them severally.
In either case, the plea of the militarist stands condemned: national safety can be secured by means other than military force. But the real truth involves a distinction which is essential to the right understanding of this phenomenon: the political security of the small States is [Pg 43] not assured; no man would take heavy odds on Holland being able to maintain complete political independence if Germany cared seriously to threaten it.
But Holland's economic security is assured. Every financier in Europe knows that if Germany conquered Holland or Belgium to-morrow, she would have to leave their wealth untouched; there could be no confiscation. And that is why the stocks of the lesser States, not in reality threatened by confiscation, yet relieved in part at least of the charge of armaments, stand fifteen to twenty points higher than those of the military States.
Belgium, politically, might disappear to-morrow; her wealth would remain practically unchanged. Yet, by one of those curious contradictions we are frequently meeting in the development of ideas, while a fact like this is at least subconsciously recognized by those whom it concerns, the necessary corollary of it—the positive form of the merely negative truth that a community's wealth cannot be stolen—is not recognized.
We admit that a people's wealth must remain unaffected by conquest, and yet we are quite prepared to urge that we can enrich ourselves by conquering them! But if we must leave their wealth alone, how can we take it? I do not speak merely of "loot. Yet that end is set up in European politics as desirable beyond all others. Here, for instance, are the Pan-Germanists of Germany.
Were this aim achieved, Germany would become the dominating Power of the Continent, and might become the dominating Power of the world. And according to the commonly accepted view, such an achievement would, from the point of view of Germany, be worth any sacrifice that Germans could make.
It would be an object so great, so desirable, that German citizens should not hesitate for an instant to give everything, life itself, in its accomplishment. Very good. Let us assume that at the cost of great sacrifice, the greatest sacrifice which it is possible to imagine a modern civilized nation making, this has been accomplished, and that Belgium and Holland and Germany, Switzerland and Austria, have all become part of the great German hegemony: is there one ordinary German citizen who would be able to say that his well-being had been increased by such a change?
Germany would then "own" Holland. But would a single German citizen be the richer for the ownership? The Hollander, from having been the citizen of a small and insignificant State, would become the citizen of a very great one.
Would the individual Hollander be any the richer or any the better? We know that, as a matter of fact, neither the German nor the Hollander would be one whit the better; and we know also, as a matter of fact, that in all probability they would be a great deal the worse.
We may, indeed, say that the Hollander would be certainly the worse, in that he would have [Pg 45] exchanged the relatively light taxation and light military service of Holland for the much heavier taxation and the much longer military service of the "great" German Empire.
The following, which appeared in the London Daily Mail in reply to an article in that paper, throws some further light on the points elaborated in this chapter.
That revenue is lost to France, and is placed at the disposal of Germany. Suppose we split the difference, and take, say, Now, if the Germans are enriched by 20 millions a year—if Alsace-Lorraine is really worth that income to the German people—how much should the English people draw from their "possessions"? There is evidently something wrong.
Does not my critic really see that this whole notion of national possessions benefiting the individual is founded [Pg 46] on mystification, upon an illusion? Germany conquered France and annexed Alsace-Lorraine.
The "Germans" consequently "own" it, and enrich themselves with this newly acquired wealth. That is my critic's view, as it is the view of most European statesmen; and it is all false. Alsace-Lorraine is owned by its inhabitants, and nobody else; and Germany, with all her ruthlessness, has not been able to dispossess them, as is proved by the fact that the matricular contribution matrikularbeitrag of the newly acquired State to the Imperial treasury which incidentally is neither 15 millions nor 40, but just over five is fixed on exactly the same scale as that of the other States of the Empire.
The change of "ownership" does not therefore of itself change the money position which is what we are now discussing of either owner or owned. In examining, in the last article on this matter, my critic's balance-sheet, I remarked that were his figures as complete as they are absurdly incomplete and misleading, I should still have been unimpressed.
We all know that very marvellous results are possible with figures; but one can generally find some simple fact which puts them to the supreme test without undue mathematics. I do not know whether it has ever happened to my critic, as it has happened to me, while watching the gambling in the casino of a Continental watering resort, to have a financial genius present weird columns of figures, which demonstrate conclusively, irrefragably, that by the system [Pg 47] which they embody one can break the bank and win a million.
I have never examined these figures, and never shall, for this reason: the genius in question is prepared to sell his wonderful secret for twenty francs. Now, in the face of that fact I am not interested in his figures.
If they were worth examination they would not be for sale. And so in this matter there are certain test facts which upset the adroitest statistical legerdemain.
Though, really, the fallacy which regards an addition of territory as an addition of wealth to the "owning" nation is a very much simpler matter than the fallacies lying behind gambling systems, which are bound up with the laws of chance and the law of averages and much else that philosophers will quarrel about till the end of time.
It requires an exceptional mathematical brain to refute those fallacies, whereas the one we are dealing with is due simply to the difficulty experienced by most of us in carrying in our heads two facts at the same time. It is so much easier to seize on one fact and forget the other. What we overlook is that Germany has also captured the people who own the property and who continue to own it. We have multiplied by x , it is true, but we have overlooked the fact that we have had to divide by x , and that the result is consequently, so far as the individual is concerned, exactly what it was before.
My critic remembered the multiplication all right, but he forgot the division. Let us apply the test fact. If a great country benefits every time it annexes a province, and her people are the richer for the widened territory, the small nations ought to be immeasurably poorer than the great, instead [Pg 48] of which, by every test which you like to apply—public credit, amounts in savings banks, standard of living, social progress, general well-being—citizens of small States are, other things being equal, as well off as, or better off than, the citizens of great States.
The citizens of countries like Holland, Belgium, Denmark, Sweden, Norway are, by every possible test, just as well off as the citizens of countries like Germany, Austria, or Russia. These are the facts which are so much more potent than any theory. If it is true that a country benefits by the acquisition of territory, and widened territory means general well-being, why do the facts so eternally deny it?
There is something wrong with the theory. In every civilized State, revenues which are drawn from a territory are expended on that territory, and there is no process known to modern government by which wealth may first be drawn from a territory into the treasury and then be redistributed with a profit to the individuals who have contributed it, or to others. It would be just as reasonable to say that the citizens of London are richer than the citizens of Birmingham because London has a richer treasury; or that Londoners would become richer if the London County Council were to annex the county of Hertford; as to say that people's wealth varies according to the size of the administrative area which they inhabit.
The whole thing is, as I have called it, an optical illusion, due to the hypnotism of an obsolete terminology. Just as poverty may be greater in the large city than in the small one, and taxation heavier, so the citizens of a great State may be poorer than the citizens of a small one, as they very often are.
Modern government is mainly, and tends to become entirely, a matter of administration. A mere jugglery [Pg 49] with the administrative entities, the absorption of small States into large ones, or the breaking up of large States into small, is not of itself going to affect the matter one way or the other. Our present terminology of international politics an historical survival—Wherein modern conditions differ from ancient—The profound change effected by Division of Labor—The delicate interdependence of international finance—Attila and the Kaiser—What would happen if a German invader looted the Bank of England—German trade dependent upon English credit—Confiscation of an enemy's property an economic impossibility under modern conditions—Intangibility of a community's wealth.
I am a citizen of the greatest Power of the modern world, and all people should bow to my greatness. And yesterday I cringed for alms to a negro savage, who repulsed me with disgust.
The meaning is that, as very frequently happens in the history of ideas, our terminology is a survival of conditions no longer existing, and our mental conceptions [Pg 51] follow at the tail of our vocabulary.
International politics are still dominated by terms applicable to conditions which the processes of modern life have altogether abolished. In the Roman times—indeed, in all the ancient world—it may have been true that the conquest of a territory meant a tangible advantage to the conqueror; it meant the exploitation of the conquered territory by the conquering State itself, to the advantage of that State and its citizens.
It not infrequently meant the enslavement of the conquered people and the acquisition of wealth in the form of slaves as a direct result of the conquering war. At a later period conquest at least involved an advantage to the reigning house of the conquering nation, and it was mainly the squabbles of rival sovereigns for prestige and power which produced the wars of many centuries. At a still later period, civilization, as a whole—not necessarily the conquering nation—gained sometimes by the conquest of savage peoples, in that order was substituted for disorder.
In the period of the colonization of newly-discovered land, the preemption of territory by one particular nation secured an advantage for the citizens of that nation, in that its overflowing population found homes in conditions [Pg 52] preferable socially, or politically, to the conditions imposed by alien nations. But none of these considerations applies to the problem with which we are dealing.
We are concerned with the case of fully civilized rival nations in fully occupied territory or with civilizations so firmly set that conquest could not sensibly modify their character, and the fact of conquering such territory gives to the conqueror no material advantage which he could not have had without conquest.
And in these conditions—the realities of the political world as we find it to-day—"domination," or "predominance of armament," or the "command of the sea," can do nothing for commerce and industry or general well-being: England may build fifty Dreadnoughts and not sell so much as a penknife the more in consequence.
She might conquer Germany to-morrow, and she would find that she could not make a single Englishman a shilling's worth the richer in consequence, the war indemnity notwithstanding. How has it become impossible for one nation to take by conquest the wealth of another for the benefit of the people of the conqueror? How is it that we are confronted by the absurdity which the facts of the British Empire go to prove of the conquering [Pg 53] people being able to exact from conquered territory rather less than more advantage than it was able to do before the conquest took place?
I am not at this stage going to pass in review all the factors that have contributed to this change, because it will suffice for the demonstration upon which I am now engaged to call attention to a phenomenon which is the outcome of all those factors and which is undeniable, and that is, the financial interdependence of the modern world.
But I will forecast here what belongs more properly to a later stage of this work, and will give just a hint of the forces which are the result mainly of one great fact—the division of labor intensified by facility of communication. When the division of labor was so little developed that every homestead produced all that it needed, it mattered nothing if part of the community was cut off from the world for weeks and months at a time. All the neighbors of a village or homestead might be slain or harassed, and no inconvenience resulted.
But if to-day an English county is by a general railroad strike cut off for so much as forty-eight hours from the rest of the economic organism, we know that whole sections of its population are threatened with famine.
If in the time of the Danes, England could by some magic have killed all foreigners, she would presumably have been the better off.
If she could do the same thing to-day, half her population would starve to death. If on one side of the frontier a community is, say, wheat-producing, and on the [Pg 54] other coal-producing, each is dependent for its very existence, on the fact of the other being able to carry on its labor. The miner cannot in a week set to and grow a crop of wheat; the farmer must wait for his wheat to grow, and must meantime feed his family and dependents.
The exchange involved here must go on, and each party have fair expectation that he will in due course be able to reap the fruits of his labor, or both must starve; and that exchange, that expectation, is merely the expression in its simplest form of commerce and credit; and the interdependence here indicated has, by the countless developments of rapid communication, reached such a condition of complexity that the interference with any given operation affects not merely the parties directly involved, but numberless others having at first sight no connection therewith.
The vital interdependence here indicated, cutting athwart frontiers, is largely the work of the last forty years; and it has, during that time, so developed as to have set up a financial interdependence of the capitals of the world, so complex that disturbance in New York involves financial and commercial disturbance in London, and, if sufficiently grave, compels financiers of London to co-operate with those of New York to put an end to the crisis, not as a matter of altruism, but as a matter of commercial self-protection.
The complexity of modern finance makes New York dependent on London, London upon Paris, Paris upon Berlin, to a greater degree than has ever yet been the case in history. This interdependence [Pg 55] is the result of the daily use of those contrivances of civilization which date from yesterday—the rapid post, the instantaneous dissemination of financial and commercial information by means of telegraphy, and generally the incredible increase in the rapidity of communication which has put the half-dozen chief capitals of Christendom in closer contact financially, and has rendered them more dependent the one upon the other than were the chief cities of Great Britain less than a hundred years ago.
A well-known French authority, writing recently in a financial publication, makes this reflection:. Under the influence of finance, industry is beginning to lose its exclusively national character to take on a character more and more international. The animosity of rival nationalities seems to be in process of attenuation as the result of this increasing international solidarity.
This solidarity was manifested in a striking fashion in the last industrial and monetary crisis. This crisis, which appeared in its most serious form in the United States and Germany, far from being any profit to rival nations, has been injurious to them.
The nations competing with America and Germany, such as England and France, have suffered only less than the countries directly affected. It must not be forgotten that, quite apart from the financial interests involved, directly or indirectly, in the industry of other countries, every producing [Pg 56] country is at one and the same time, as well as being a competitor and a rival, a client and a market.
Financial and commercial solidarity is increasing every day at the expense of commercial and industrial competition. There can be no doubt, for those who have studied the question, that the influence of this international economic solidarity is increasing despite ourselves.
It has not resulted from conscious action on the part of any of us, and it certainly cannot be arrested by any conscious action on our part. When the German army is looting the cellars of the Bank of England, and carrying off the foundations of our whole national fortune, perhaps the twaddlers who are now screaming about the wastefulness of building four more Dreadnoughts will understand why sane men are regarding this opposition as treasonable nonsense.
What would be the result of such an action on the part of a German army in London? The first effect, of course, would be that, as the Bank of England is the banker of all other banks, there would be a run on every bank in England, and all would suspend payment. But London being the clearing-house of the world, bills drawn thereon but held by foreigners would not be met; they would be valueless; the [Pg 57] loanable value of money in other centres would be enormously raised, and instruments of credit enormously depreciated; prices of all kinds of stocks would fall, and holders would be threatened by ruin and insolvency.
German finance would represent a condition as chaotic as that of England. Whatever advantage German credit might gain by holding England's gold it would certainly be more than offset by the fact that it was the ruthless action of the German Government that had produced the general catastrophe.
A country that could sack bank reserves would be a good one for foreign investors to avoid: the essential of credit is confidence, and those who repudiate it pay dearly for their action. The German Generalissimo in London might be no more civilized than Attila himself, but he would soon find the difference between himself and Attila. Attila, luckily for him, did not have to worry about a bank rate and such-like complications; but the German General, while trying to sack the Bank of England, would find that his own balance in the Bank of Germany would have vanished into thin air, and the value of even the best of his investments dwindled as though by a miracle; and that for the sake of loot, amounting to a few sovereigns apiece among his soldiery, he would have sacrificed the greater part of his own personal fortune.
It is as certain as anything can be that, were the German army guilty of such economic vandalism, there is no considerable institution in Germany that would escape grave damage—a damage in credit and security [Pg 58] so serious as to constitute a loss immensely greater [12] than the value of the loot obtained. It is not putting the case too strongly to say that for every pound taken from the Bank of England German trade would pay many times over.
The influence of the whole finance of Germany would be brought to bear on the German Government to put an end to a situation ruinous to German trade, and German finance would only be saved from utter collapse by an undertaking on the part of the German Government scrupulously to respect private property, and especially bank reserves. It is true the German Jingoes might wonder what they had made war for, and this elementary lesson in international finance would do more than the greatness of the British navy to cool their blood.
For it is a fact in human nature that men will fight more readily than they will pay, and that they will take personal risks much more readily than they will disgorge money, or, for that matter, earn it. Events which are still fresh in the memory of business men show the extraordinary interdependence of the modern financial world. A financial crisis in New York sends up the English bank rate to 7 per cent. It thus happens that one section of the financial world is, against its will, compelled to come [Pg 59] to the rescue of any other considerable section which may be in distress.
From a modern and delightfully lucid treatise on international finance, [13] I take the following very suggestive passages:. Banking in all countries hangs together so closely that the strength of the best may easily be that of the weakest if scandal arises owing to the mistakes of the worst Just as a man cycling down a crowded street depends for his life not only on his skill, but more on the course of the traffic there Banks in Berlin were obliged, from motives of self-protection on the occasion of the Wall Street crisis , to let some of their gold go to assuage the American craving for it If the crisis became so severe that London had to restrict its facilities in this respect, other centres, which habitually keep balances in London which they regard as so much gold, because a draft on London is as good as gold, would find themselves very seriously inconvenienced; and it thus follows that it is to the interest of all other centres which trade on those facilities which London alone gives to take care that London's task is not made too difficult.
This is especially so in the case of foreigners, who keep a balance in London which is borrowed. In fact, London drew in the gold required for New York from seventeen other countries Incidentally it may be mentioned in this connection that German commerce is in a special sense [Pg 60] interested in the maintenance of English credit.
The authority just quoted says:. It is even contended that the rapid expansion of German trade, which pushed itself largely by its elasticity and adaptability to the wishes of its customers, could never have been achieved if it had not been assisted by the large credit furnished in London No one can quarrel with the Germans for making use of the credit we offered for the expansion of the German trade, although their over-extension of credit facilities has had results which fall on others besides themselves Let us hope that our German friends are duly grateful, and let us avoid the mistake of supposing that we have done ourselves any permanent harm by giving this assistance.
It is to the economic interests of humanity at large that production should be stimulated, and the economic interest of humanity at large is the interest of England, with its mighty world-wide trade.
Germany has quickened production with the help of English credit, and so has every other economically civilized country in the world. It is a fact that all of them, including our own colonies, develop their resources with the help of British capital and credit, and then do their utmost to keep out our productions by means of tariffs, which make it appear to superficial observers that England provides capital for the destruction of its own business. But in practice the system works quite otherwise, for all these countries that develop their resources with our money aim at developing an export trade and selling goods to us, and as they have not yet reached the point of economic altruism at which they are prepared to sell goods for nothing, the increase in their production means an [Pg 61] increasing demand for our commodities and our services.
And in the meantime the interest on our capital and credit, and the profits of working the machinery of exchange, are a comfortable addition to our national income. But what is a further corollary of this situation? It is that Germany is to-day in a larger sense than she ever was before England's debtor, and that her industrial success is bound up with English financial security.
What would be the situation in Britain, therefore, on the morrow of a conflict in which that country was successful? I have seen mentioned the possibility of the conquest and annexation of the free port of Hamburg by a victorious British fleet. Let us assume that the British Government has done this, and is proceeding to turn the annexed and confiscated property to account.
Now, the property was originally of two kinds: part was private property, and part was German Government, or rather Hamburg Government, property. The income of the latter was earmarked for the payment of interest of certain Government stock, and the action of the British Government, therefore, renders the stock all but valueless, and in the case of the shares of the private companies entirely so.
The paper becomes unsaleable. But it is held in various forms—as collateral and otherwise—by many important banking concerns, insurance companies, and [Pg 62] so on, and this sudden collapse of value shatters their solvency.
Their collapse not only involves many credit institutions in Germany, but, as these in their turn are considerable debtors of London, English institutions are also involved. London is also involved in another way. As explained previously, many foreign concerns keep balances in London, and the action of the British Government having precipitated a monetary crisis in Germany, there is a run on London to withdraw all balances.
In a double sense London is feeling the pinch, and it would be a miracle if already at this point the whole influence of British finance were not thrown against the action of the British Government. Assume, however, that the Government, making the best of a bad job, continues its administration of the property, and proceeds to arrange for loans for the purpose of putting it once more in good condition after the ravages of war.
The banks, however, finding that the original titles have through the action of the British Government become waste paper, and British financiers having already burned their fingers with that particular class of property, withhold support, and money is only procurable at extortionate rates of interest—so extortionate that it becomes quite evident that as a Governmental enterprise the thing could not be made to pay. An attempt is made to sell the property to British and German concerns.
But the same paralyzing sense of insecurity hangs over the whole business. Neither German nor British financiers can forget that the bonds and shares of this property have [Pg 63] already been turned into waste paper by the action of the British Government. The British Government finds, in fact, that it can do nothing with the financial world unless first it confirms the title of the original owners to the property, and gives an assurance that titles to all property throughout the conquered territory shall be respected.
In other words, confiscation has been a failure. For the full reference, see the Microsoft TechNet Robocopy page. Robocopy syntax is markedly different from its predecessors copy and xcopy , in that it accepts only folder names, without trailing backslash, as its source and destination arguments. The files named are copied only from the folder selected for copying; fully qualified path names are not supported.
This means that they will be invisible to normal access including DIR in cmd. Robocopy outputs to the screen, or optionally to a log file, the names of all the directories it encounters, in alphabetical order. Each name is preceded by the number of files in the directory that fulfill the criteria for being copied. At the end of the output is a table giving numbers of directories, files, and bytes.
For each of these, the table gives the total number found in the source, the number copied including directories marked "New Dir" even if they are not copied , the number skipped because they already exist in the target , and the number of mismatches , FAILED , and extras. There is also a row of time taken in which the time spent on failed files seems to be in the wrong column. Robocopy's " inter-packet gap " IPG option allows some control over the network bandwidth used in a session.
In theory, the following formula expresses the delay D , in milliseconds required to simulate a desired bandwidth B D , in kilobits per second , over a network link with an available bandwidth of B A kbps:. In practice however, some experimentation is usually required to find a suitable delay, due to factors such as the nature and volume of other traffic on the network.
The methodology employed by the IPG option may not offer the same level of control provided by some other bandwidth throttling technologies, such as BITS which is used by Windows Update and BranchCache.
NET Framework 2. It is no longer available from Microsoft, but may be downloaded from the Internet Archive 's Wayback Machine. Ken Tamaru of Microsoft developed a copying program with functionality similar to Robocopy, called RichCopy , discontinued in It is not based on Robocopy, and does not require. NET Framework. From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia. Robocopy Developer s Microsoft Initial release , 25—26 years ago Stable release March 22, Internet Explorer.
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Windows 10 version 1909 iso download deutsche post - none. The Great Illusion
Copyright,by G. Deutcshe Editions of this book are now on sale in the following countries :. If this, the fourth American edition, is bulkier than its predecessors, it is chiefly because the events of the last two years throw an interesting light upon the bearing of the book's main thesis on actual world problems.
I have, therefore, added an appendix dealing with certain criticisms nnoe upon the nature of the first Balkan War, in the course of which I attempt to show just how the principles elaborated here have been working out in European politics. That American interest in the problems here discussed is hardly less vital than that of Windows 10 version 1909 iso download deutsche post - none I am even more persuaded than when the first American edition of this book was issued in It is certain that opinion in America will not be equipped for dealing with her windows 10 version 1909 iso download deutsche post - none problems arising out of her relations with the Spanish Windoqs states, with Japan, with the Philippines, unless it has some fair understanding of the principles with which this book deals.
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That the interests duetsche Americans are inextricably, if indirectly, bound up with those of Europe, has become increasingly clear as can be proved by the barest investigation of the trend of political windows 10 version 1909 iso download deutsche post - none in this country. The thesis on its economic nons is discussed in terms of the gravest problem which now faces European statesmanship, but these terms are also the living symbols of a principle of universal application, as true ppost reference to American dowwnload as to European.
If I have not "localized" the discussion by using illustrations drawn from purely American cases, it is because these problems have not at present, in the United States, reached the acute stage that they have in Europe, and illustrations drawn from the conditions of an actual dowload pressing problem give to any discussion a reality which to some extent it might lose pkst discussed on the basis of more supposititious cases.
It so happens, however, that in the more abstract section of the discussion embraced in the second part, which I have 19009 the "Human Nature of the Case," I have gone mainly to American authors for the statement of cases based on those illusions with which the book deals. For this edition I have thought verson worth while thoroughly to vversion the whole of the book and to [Pg v] re-write the chapter on the payment of the French Indemnity, in order to clear up a misunderstanding to which in its first form it gave rise.
Part III has also been re-written, in order to meet the changed form of criticism which has resulted from the discussion of this subject during the last year or two. It is with very great regret that I have seen this book grow in bulk; but as it constitutes the statement of a thesis still versoin, it has to cover the whole ground of windows 10 version 1909 iso download deutsche post - none discussion, sometimes in great detail. I have, however, adopted an arrangement and method of presentation by which, I trust, the increase in bulk will not render it less clear.
The general arrangement is as follows:. Nond Synopsis is a very brief indication of the scope of the whole argument, which is not that war is impossible, but that it is futile—useless, even when completely victorious, as a means dowjload securing those moral or material ends which represent the needs of modern civilized peoples; and that on a general realization of this truth depends the solution of the problem of armaments and warfare.
The practical outcome—what should be our policy with reference to defence, why progress depends isl the improvement of public opinion and the best general methods of securing that—is discussed in Deutshce III. This method of treatment has involved some small repetition of fact and illustration, but the nons is trifling in wundows does not amount in all to the value of more than three or four pages—and I have been more concerned to make the matter in hand clear qindows the reader than to observe all the literary canons.
I may add that, apart from this, the hone of condensation has been carried windows 10 version 1909 iso download deutsche post - none its extreme limit for the character of data dealt with, and that those detsche desire to understand thoroughly the significance of the thesis with which the book deals—it is worth understanding—had really better read every line of it!
One personal word may perhaps be excused as explaining certain phraseology, which would seem to indicate that the author is of English nationality. He happens to be of English birth, but to have passed his youth and early manhood in the United States, having acquired American citizenship there.
This I hope entitles him to use the collective "we" on vdrsion sides of the Atlantic. I may add that the last fifteen years have been passed mainly in Europe studying at first hand the problems here dealt with. The present volume is the outcome of a large pamphlet published in Страница at windows 10 version 1909 iso download deutsche post - none end of last year entitled Europe's Optical Illusion.
The interest that the pamphlet created and the character of the discussion provoked throughout Europe persuaded me that its subject-matter was worth fuller and more detailed treatment than then given it. Herewith the result of that conviction. The thesis on its economic side is discussed in the terms of the gravest problem which now faces European statesmanship, but these terms are also the living symbols of a principle of universal application, as true with reference to American windows 10 version 1909 iso download deutsche post - none as to European.
If I have not "localized" the discussion by using illustrations drawn from purely American cases, it is because these problems have not at present in the United States reached the acute stage that they have in Europe, and illustrations drawn from the conditions of an actual and pressing problem give to any discussion a reality which to some extent it might lose if discussed on the basis of more io cases.
It so happens, however, that in the more abstract iiso viii] section of the discussion embraced in the second part, which I have termed download windows 10 pro - installer windows pro 64 bit "Human Nature of the Case," I have gone mainly to American authors for windows 10 version 1909 iso download deutsche post - none statement of cases based on those illusions with which the book deals.
What are the fundamental motives that explain the present rivalry of armaments in Europe, notably the Anglo-German? Each nation pleads the need for defence; but this implies that someone is likely to attack, and has therefore a presumed interest in so doing. What are the motives which each State thus fears its neighbors may obey?
They are based on the universal assumption that a nation, in order to find outlets for expanding population and increasing industry, or simply to ensure the dlwnload conditions possible for its people, is necessarily pushed to territorial expansion and the exercise of political force against others Windows 10 version 1909 iso download deutsche post - none naval competition is assumed to be the expression of the growing need of an expanding population for a larger place in the world, a увидеть больше which will find a realization in the conquest of English Colonies or trade, unless these are defended ; it is assumed, therefore, that a nation's relative prosperity is broadly determined by its political power; that nations being competing units, узнать больше здесь, in the last resort, goes to the possessor of preponderant military force, the weaker going to the wall, as in the other forms of the struggle for life.
The author challenges this whole doctrine. He [Pg x] attempts deutscye show that it belongs to a stage of development out of which we have passed; that the commerce and industry of a people no longer depend upon the expansion of its political frontiers; that a nation's political and downloqd frontiers do not now necessarily coincide; that military power is socially and economically futile, and can have no relation to the prosperity of the people exercising it; СЕРВЕР download ms office full version bagas31 officemax coupon ФУФЁЛ!!! it is impossible for one nation to seize by force the wealth or trade of another—to enrich itself by subjugating, or imposing its will by force on another; that, in short, war, even when victorious, can no longer achieve those aims for which peoples strive.
He establishes this apparent paradox, in so far as the economic problem is concerned, by showing that wealth in the economically civilized world is founded upon credit and commercial contract downlaod being the outgrowth of an economic interdependence due to the increasing division of labor and greatly developed communication.
If credit and commercial contract are tampered with in an attempt at confiscation, the credit-dependent wealth is undermined, and its windows 10 version 1909 iso download deutsche post - none involves that of the conqueror; so that if conquest is not to be self-injurious it must respect the enemy's property, in which case it becomes economically futile.
Thus the wealth /5914.txt conquered territory remains in the hands of the population of such territory. When Germany annexed Alsatia, no windows 10 version 1909 iso download deutsche post - none German secured a single mark's worth of Alsatian property as the spoils of war.
Перейти in the modern world is a process of multiplying by [Pg xi] xand then obtaining the original figure by dividing by x. For a modern nation to add to its territory no more adds to the wealth of the psot of such nation than it would add to the wealth of Londoners if the City of London were to annex the county of Hertford.
The author also shows that international finance has become so interdependent windows 10 version 1909 iso download deutsche post - none so interwoven with trade and industry that the intangibility of an enemy's property extends to his trade. It results that political and military power can in reality do nothing for trade; the individual merchants and manufacturers of small nations, exercising no such power, compete successfully with those of the great.
Swiss and Belgian merchants drive English from the British Colonial market; Norway has, relatively to population, a greater mercantile marine than Great Britain; the public credit as poet rough-and-ready indication, among others, of security and wealth of small States possessing no political power often stands higher than that of the Great Powers of Europe, Belgian Three per Cents.
The forces which have brought about the economic futility of military power have also rendered it futile as a means of enforcing a nation's moral ideals or imposing social institutions upon a conquered people.
Germany could not turn Canada or Australia into German colonies— i. The necessary security in their material possessions enjoyed by the inhabitants of such conquered provinces, quick inter-communication by a cheap press, widely-read literature, deutsfhe even small communities to become windows 10 version 1909 iso download deutsche post - none and effectively to defend their special social or moral possessions, even when military conquest has been complete.
The fight windws ideals can no longer take the form of fight between nations, because the lines of division on moral questions are within the nations themselves and intersect the political frontiers. There is no modern State which is completely Catholic or Protestant, or liberal or autocratic, or aristocratic or democratic, or socialist or individualist; the moral windos spiritual struggles of the modern world go on between citizens of the same State in unconscious intellectual co-operation with corresponding groups in other States, not between the public powers of rival States.
This classification by strata involves necessarily a redirection of human pugnacity, based rather on the rivalry of classes and interests than on State divisions.
War has no longer the justification that it makes for the survival of the fittest; it involves the survival of the less fit.
The idea that windowa struggle between nations is a part of the evolutionary law of man's advance involves a profound misreading of the biological analogy. The warlike nations do not inherit the earth; they represent the decaying human element. These tendencies, mainly the outcome of purely modern conditions e. The author urges that these little-recognized facts may be utilized for the solution of the armament difficulty on at present untried lines—by such modification of opinion in Europe that winows of the present motive to aggression will cease to be operative, and by thus diminishing the risk of attack, diminishing to the same extent the need for defence.
He shows how such a political reformation is within the scope of practical politics, and the methods which should be employed to bring it about. Where can the Anglo-German rivalry of armaments end? It is generally admitted that the present rivalry in armaments in Europe—notably such as that now in progress between England and Winddows go on in its present form indefinitely.
Windoqs net result of each side meeting the efforts of the other with similar efforts is that at the widows of a given period the relative position of each is what it was originally, and the enormous sacrifices of both doanload gone for nothing. If as between England and Germany it is claimed that England is in a position to maintain the lead because she has the money, Germany can retort that she is in a position to maintain the lead because she has the population, which must, in the case deugsche a highly organized European nation, in the end mean money.
Meanwhile, neither side can yield to the other, as the [Pg 4] one so doing would, it is felt, be placed at the mercy of the other, a situation which neither will accept. There are two current solutions which are offered as a means of windows 10 version 1909 iso download deutsche post - none from this impasse.
There vfrsion that of the smaller party, regarded in both countries for the most part as one of dreamers and doctrinaires, who hope to solve the problem by a resort to general disarmament, or, at least, a limitation of armament by agreement. And there is that of the larger, which is esteemed the more practical party, of those who are dowwnload that the present state of rivalry and recurrent irritation is bound to culminate in an armed conflict, which, by definitely reducing one or other of the parties to a position of manifest inferiority, will settle the thing for at least wnidows time, until after a longer or shorter period a state of relative equilibrium is established, and the whole process will be recommenced da capo.
This second solution is, on the whole, accepted as one of the laws of life: one of the hard facts of existence which men of ordinary courage take as all in the day's work. And in every country those favoring the other solution are looked upon either as people who fail to realize the hard facts of the world in which they live, or as people less concerned with the security of their country than with upholding a somewhat emasculate ideal; ready to weaken the defences of their own country on no better assurance than that the prospective enemy will not be so wicked as to attack them.
To this the virile man is apt to oppose the law of [Pg 5] conflict. Deutscche of what vownload nineteenth century has taught us of the evolution of life on izo planet is pressed into the service of this struggle-for-life philosophy. We are reminded of the survival of the fittest, that the weakest go to the wall, and that all deutscne, sentient and non-sentient, is verskon a life of battle. The sacrifice involved in armament is the price which nations pay for their safety and for their political power.
The power of England has been the main condition of her past industrial success; her trade has been extensive and her merchants rich, because she has been able to make her political and military force felt, and to exercise her influence смотрите подробнее all the nations of the world.
If she has dominated the commerce of the world, it is 9109 her unconquered navy has dominated, and continues to dominate, all the avenues of commerce. This is the currently accepted argument. The fact that Germany has of late come to the front pist an industrial nation, making giant strides ios general prosperity and well-being, is deemed also to be the result of her military successes and the increasing political power which she is coming to exercise in Continental Europe.
These things, alike in England and in Germany, are accepted as the axioms of the problem, as the citations given in the next chapter sufficiently prove. I deursche not aware that a single authority of note, at least in the world of workaday politics, has ever challenged or disputed them.
Even those who have occupied prominent positions in the propaganda of peace are at one with the veriest fire-eaters [Pg 6] on this point. Stead was посмотреть еще of the leaders of the big navy party in England. Frederic Harrison, who all his life had been known as the philosopher protagonist of peace, declared recently that, if England allowed Germany to downliad ahead of her downlozd the race for armaments, "famine, social anarchy, incalculable chaos in the industrial and financial world, would be the inevitable result.
Britain may oost on How idle are fine words about retrenchment, peace, and brotherhood, whilst we windowe open to the risk deustche unutterable ruin, to a deadly fight for national existence, to war in its most destructive and cruel form. Germany's] navy deutdche order to confine the commercial rivalry of England within innocuous limits, and to deter the sober sense of the English people from the extremely threatening thought of attack upon us The German navy is a condition of our bare existence and independence, like the daily bread on which we depend not only for ourselves, but for our children.
Deutschs by a situation of this sort, one is bound to feel that the deuhsche argument of the pacifist entirely breaks down; and it breaks down for a very simple reason.
He himself accepts the premise which has just been indicated—viz. The proposition even to the pacifist seems so self-evident that he makes no effort to combat it. He pleads his dowlnoad otherwise. What we plead is that if the two parties were to devote to honest labor the time and energy devoted to preying upon на этой странице other, the permanent gain would more than offset the occasional booty.
Some pacifists go further, and take the ground that there is a conflict between the natural law and the moral law, and xeutsche we must choose the moral even to our hurt. Thus Mr. Edward Grubb writes:. Self-preservation is not the final law for nations any more than for individuals The progress of humanity may demand the extinction in this world of the individual, and it may demand also the example and the inspiration of a martyr nation.
So long as the Divine providence has need of us, Windows 10 version 1909 iso download deutsche post - none faith ddownload that we shall trust for our safety to the unseen but real forces of right dealing, truthfulness, and love; but, should the will of God demand it, we must be prepared, as Jeremiah taught his nation long ago, to give up even our national life for furthering those great ends "to which the whole creation moves.
This may be "fanaticism," but, if so, it is the fanaticism of Christ and of the prophets, and we are willing to take our places along with them. The foregoing is really the keynote of much pacifist propaganda.
In our own day, Count Tolstoi has even expressed anger at the suggestion that any reaction against militarism, on other than moral grounds, can be efficacious.
Windows 10 version 1909 iso download deutsche post - none
Where can I download stock Windows 10 pro The normal link gives you version which is useless and I'm having so many bugs with it should be scraped, or at least pulled till its more stable with other Microsoft products. Attachments: Up to 10 attachments including images can be used with a maximum of 3.
A couple of possibilities are via a Visual Studio subscription or possibly the volume center. As far as I know the only public download on microsoft. Regards, Dave Patrick Disclaimer: This posting is provided "AS IS" with no warranties or guarantees, and confers no rights.
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How do I stop Feature update from installing. Skip to main content. Find threads, tags, and users Hi All Where can I download stock Windows 10 pro Comment Show 0. Current Visibility: Visible to all users. Hi, You may also consider rolling back to the previous Windows 10 version, unless you have cleaned it with Disk Cleanup. Choose Recovery from the left column and then pass to corresponding right. Best regards, Leon. Hi, Windows 10 ISO is only available downloaded from subscription website such as VLSC volume licensing service center which would not possible to get into hand for personal customers.
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